diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter.yml b/detections/deprecated/linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter.yml
similarity index 91%
rename from detections/endpoint/linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter.yml
rename to detections/deprecated/linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter.yml
index 379e5c6183..6c550de21d 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter.yml
+++ b/detections/deprecated/linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 name: Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter
 id: 52f6d751-1fd4-4c74-a4c9-777ecfeb5c58
-version: 11
+version: 12
 creation_date: '2021-12-21'
-modification_date: '2026-05-13'
+modification_date: '2026-09-03'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-status: production
+status: deprecated
 type: Hunting
 description: The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to cron jobs on Linux systems using the crontab command with list parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code on a schedule. If confirmed malicious, the impact could include unauthorized code execution, data destruction, or other damaging outcomes. Further investigation should analyze the added cron job, its associated command, and any related processes.
 data_source:
@@ -60,3 +60,8 @@ tests:
           source: not_applicable
           sourcetype: cisco:isovalent:processExec
       test_type: unit
+deprecation_info:
+    reason: Detection deprecated as its name and description are not matching the behavior of the search. The search is looking for crontab command with list parameter, not adding a new cron job.
+    removed_in_version: 6.8.0
+    replacement_content:
+        - Linux Crontab Enumeration
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml b/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml
index 422eeccc3e..4082fc5412 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml
@@ -1,39 +1,60 @@
 name: Jscript Execution Using Cscript App
 id: 002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122
-version: 13
+version: 14
 creation_date: '2021-09-14'
-modification_date: '2026-05-13'
+modification_date: '2026-08-31'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 status: production
-type: TTP
-description: The following analytic detects the execution of JScript using the cscript.exe process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This behavior is significant because JScript files are typically executed by wscript.exe, making cscript.exe execution unusual and potentially indicative of malicious activity, such as the FIN7 group's tactics. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts, leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
+type: Anomaly
+description: |-
+    The following analytic detects the execution of JScript using the cscript.exe process.
+    It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry.
+    This behavior is significant because JScript files are typically executed by wscript.exe, making cscript.exe execution unusual and potentially indicative of malicious activity, such as the FIN7 group's tactics.
+    If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts, leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
 data_source:
     - Sysmon EventID 1
     - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
 search: |-
-    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-      WHERE (
+    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
+      count min(_time) as firstTime
+            max(_time) as lastTime
+
+    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
+    (
+        (
             Processes.parent_process_name = "cscript.exe"
-            AND
             Processes.parent_process = "*//e:jscript*"
         )
-        OR (Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" AND Processes.process = "*//e:jscript*")
-      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
-         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
-         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
-         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
-         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
-         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
-         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
+        OR
+        (
+            Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe"
+            Processes.process = "*//e:jscript*"
+        )
+    )
+
+    NOT Processes.process="*/Job:AgentHIScript*"
+    NOT Processes.parent_process="*/Job:AgentHIScript*"
+
+    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
+       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
+       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
+       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
+       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
+       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
+       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
+
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
     | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
     | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`
-how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
-known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
+how_to_implement: |-
+    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: |-
+    Symantec Host Integrity check uses Jscript through cscript.exe
 references:
     - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation
     - https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/
+    - https://nasbench.medium.com/symantec-endpoint-protection-meets-com-using-symantec-sshelper-as-a-lolbin-40d515a121ce
 drilldown_searches:
     - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
       search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
@@ -43,18 +64,17 @@ drilldown_searches:
       search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
       earliest_offset: 7d
       latest_offset: "0"
-finding:
-    title: Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript on $dest$
-    entity:
-        field: user
-        type: user
-        score: 50
 intermediate_findings:
     entities:
         - field: dest
           type: system
-          score: 50
-          message: Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript on $dest$
+          score: 20
+          message: The process [$parent_process_name$] with commandline [$parent_process$] launched [$process_name$] with commandline [$process$] on [$dest$]
+threat_objects:
+    - field: parent_process
+      type: process
+    - field: process
+      type: process
 analytic_story:
     - FIN7
     - Remcos
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_crontab_enumeration.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_crontab_enumeration.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbbe3ecedd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_crontab_enumeration.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+name: Linux Crontab Enumeration
+id: 8ef82980-0e95-43d7-a802-b488b668d14f
+version: 1
+creation_date: '2026-09-03'
+modification_date: '2026-09-03'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Hunting
+description: |-
+    The following analytic detects the use of the crontab command with the list parameter (-l) to enumerate scheduled tasks configured in the invoking user's crontab on Linux systems.
+    Adversaries may use this information to identify persistence mechanisms, scheduled execution, or potential privilege escalation opportunities.
+    The use of crontab -l is also common administrative activity and may require tuning based on the executing user, parent process, and environment.
+data_source:
+    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
+    - Cisco Isovalent Process Exec
+search: |-
+    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
+      count min(_time) as firstTime
+            max(_time) as lastTime
+
+    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
+
+    Processes.process_name = "crontab"
+    Processes.process= "* -l*"
+
+    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
+       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
+       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
+       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
+       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
+       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
+       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
+
+    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+    | `linux_crontab_enumeration_filter`
+how_to_implement: |-
+    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: |-
+    Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
+    - https://cert.gov.ua/article/39518
+analytic_story:
+    - Cisco Isovalent Suspicious Activity
+    - Industroyer2
+    - Linux Privilege Escalation
+    - Linux Living Off The Land
+    - Data Destruction
+    - Linux Persistence Techniques
+    - Scheduled Tasks
+    - Gomir
+    - VoidLink Cloud-Native Linux Malware
+asset_type: Endpoint
+mitre_attack_id:
+    - T1053.003
+product:
+    - Splunk Enterprise
+    - Splunk Enterprise Security
+    - Splunk Cloud
+category: endpoint
+security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+    - name: True Positive Test
+      attack_data:
+        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_list_parameter/sysmon_linux.log
+          source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+          sourcetype: sysmon:linux
+      test_type: unit
+    - name: True Positive Test - Cisco Isovalent
+      attack_data:
+        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_isovalent/cisco_isovalent.log
+          source: not_applicable
+          sourcetype: cisco:isovalent:processExec
+      test_type: unit
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_private_keys_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_private_keys_discovery.yml
index 987fe3bc56..b55f95f5e9 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/windows_private_keys_discovery.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_private_keys_discovery.yml
@@ -1,36 +1,71 @@
 name: Windows Private Keys Discovery
 id: 5c1c2877-06c0-40ee-a1a2-db71f1372b5b
-version: 12
+version: 13
 creation_date: '2022-12-06'
-modification_date: '2026-05-13'
+modification_date: '2026-08-31'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 status: production
 type: Anomaly
-description: The following analytic identifies processes that retrieve information related to private key files, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that search for private key certificates. This activity is significant as it indicates potential attempts to locate insecurely stored credentials, which adversaries can exploit for privilege escalation, persistence, or remote service authentication. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to access sensitive information, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the compromised environment.
+description: |-
+    The following analytic identifies processes that retrieve information related to private key files, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas.
+    This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that search for private key certificates.
+    This activity is significant as it indicates potential attempts to locate insecurely stored credentials, which adversaries can exploit for privilege escalation, persistence, or remote service authentication.
+    If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to access sensitive information, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the compromised environment.
 data_source:
     - Sysmon EventID 1
     - Windows Event Log Security 4688
     - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
 search: |-
-    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-      WHERE Processes.process = "*dir *"
-        OR
-        Processes.process = "*findstr*"
-        AND
-        Processes.process IN ( "*.rdg*", "*.gpg*", "*.pgp*", "*.p12*", "*.der*", "*.csr*", "*.cer*", "*.ovpn*", "*.key*",  "*.ppk*", "*.p12*", "*.pem*", "*.pfx*", "*.p7b*", "*.asc*")
-      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
-         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
-         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
-         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
-         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
-         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
-         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
+    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
+      count min(_time) as firstTime
+            max(_time) as lastTime
+
+    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
+
+    Processes.process_name IN (
+        "cmd.exe",
+        "findstr.exe",
+        "powershell.exe",
+        "pwsh.exe"
+    )
+    Processes.process IN (
+        "*.asc*",
+        "*.cer*",
+        "*.csr*",
+        "*.der*",
+        "*.gpg*",
+        "*.key*",
+        "*.ovpn*",
+        "*.p12*",
+        "*.p12*",
+        "*.p7b*",
+        "*.pem*",
+        "*.pfx*",
+        "*.pgp*",
+        "*.ppk*",
+        "*.rdg*"
+    )
+
+    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
+       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
+       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
+       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
+       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
+       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
+       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
+
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+
+    | regex process="(?i)[^\.\-\_\$a-zA-Z](dir\s|findstr)"
+    | regex process="(?i)\.(?:rdg|gpg|pgp|p12|der|csr|cer|ovpn|key|ppk|p12|pem|pfx|p7b|asc)\b"
+
     | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
     | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
     | `windows_private_keys_discovery_filter`
-how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
-known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
+how_to_implement: |-
+    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: |-
+    Very long command line arguments may contain these keywords in irrelevant sections of the code.
 references:
     - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004/
     - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/winPEAS
@@ -49,7 +84,12 @@ intermediate_findings:
         - field: dest
           type: system
           score: 20
-          message: a process with commandline $process$ that can retrieve information related to private keys on $dest$
+          message: A process with commandline [$process$] that can retrieve information related to private keys was executed on [$dest$]
+threat_objects:
+    - field: parent_process
+      type: process
+    - field: process
+      type: process
 analytic_story:
     - Windows Post-Exploitation
     - Prestige Ransomware